

Program Intervention in Ache's Conflict

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Program Intervention in Aceh's Conflict

Abstract:

When the 30 year long identity and independence movement by the Acehnese people under the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) against the Republic of Indonesia (RI) has reached to an international concern, the conflict has already left more than ten thousands dead. The suppression by RI's government to the Acehnese people's movement was extremely high. The Aceh province is full of natural resources, which are main concern of both the parties in conflict. The RI does not want to loose her grip on Aceh. On the other hand, the Acehnese think that the extraction of resources from their land is not used for their livelihood and development; rather it is totally utilized by the central government. The Acehnese fought for their autonomy, identity and their own development. In this context, the natural devastation in Dec. 2004, inflicted by the Tsunami in the coastal area of the Aceh province entirely changes the conflict dynamics of the Acehnese community. On August 2005, a peace treaty has been signed between RI and GAM, ending 30 year violent conflict in Aceh. In the process of implementing the peace accord, the rebels surrendered their arms in Dec. 2005 and RI has gradually started responding people's identity issues and economic demands. This paper is tried to design program/s for the post-conflict and post Tsunami Aceh. In the process of designing the program, the effects of Tsunami have also been considered because the Tsunami changes the conflict dynamics of the areas. The designed program can be implemented by both NGOs and/or provincial government of Aceh. Due to the length and limitation of this paper only a couple of programs are suggested here.

1. Background Information

Indonesia¹ is an archipelago in Southeast Asia consisting of 17,000 islands (6,000 inhabited). Its neighbor to the north is Malaysia; to the east is Papua New Guinea. Indonesia has the largest number of active volcanoes in the world and is therefore sometimes called the “Ring of Fire”. Earthquakes are frequent. Indonesia is home to a diversity of cultures and customs. Muslim invasions began in the 13th century, and most of the archipelago had converted to Islam by the 15th century, whereas they were formerly influenced by the Hindu religion. Portuguese traders arrived early in the 16th century, but they were later ousted by the Dutch. The Dutch United East India Company established posts on the island of Java, in an effort to control the spice trade. The fight over natural resources continues within the foreign state Dutch, British, Portugal and Japan. In December, 1949, Indonesia’s independence was declared from the last occupier, the Dutch. After the independence, there was a fair and democratic government in nature. In 1967, the president Sukarno, a democratic liberal leader, was toppled by the then military general Suharto. General Suharto ruled the country under the military dictatorship for 32 years.

In 1997, Indonesia suffered a major economic recession, along with most other Asian economies. Banks failed and the value of Indonesia's currency, the Rupiah, heavily dropped. Antigovernment demonstrations and riots broke out in different cities. As the economic crisis deepened, student demonstrators occupied the national parliament, demanding Suharto's ouster. On May 21, 1998, Suharto stepped down, ending his 32 years of autocratic rule. June 7, 1999 marked Indonesia's first free parliamentary election since

¹ Most of the data regarding Indonesia in this topic has been retrieved from these government and other web side: <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107634.html>, <http://www.geographia.com/indonesia/>, <http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/#>

1955. The ruling Golkar Party took a backseat to the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president.

In Dec. 2002, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the Megawati government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), trying to end the 28 year insurgency. However, in May 2003, it was broken and the government declared military rule and launched an offensive action to destroy the GAM. Again, with added pressure from international community and civil society, the government and the GAM signed a peace treaty in Aug. 2005, ending the 30-year long civil war. As part of the accord, the rebels surrendered their arms and the government gradually withdrew its troops. In addition, the Acehnese agreed to give up their demand for independence in exchange for the right to establish political parties and autonomy in Aceh province. The RI made a special act on the Aceh province and its governance system. The separatists disbanded their army in December, finalizing the end to their insurgency.

2. Introduction of Aceh

According to a 2003 census, 'Aceh province'² has 393,000 populations in 22149 sq mi area. Most of the Acehnese (about 98.6%) are Muslim. The main ethnic group Acehnese occupied 70% population. Aceh is a diverse region occupied by several ethnic and language groups. There is also a significant population of Chinese, who are influential in the business and financial communities. The Acehnese language is widely spoken within the Acehnese population.

² Most of data about Aceh has been retrieved from Aceh-government website: <http://aceh.net/index.html>.

“The history of Aceh has deep roots in the past, even before 1292 A.D. Acehnese fought several wars against Islamic ruler, Dutch (in 1871-1873 and 1903-1911), British and Japanese (in World War II)”³. In each time in whole of their history, Acehnese people never accepted foreign invasion, peacefully rising resistance against the foreign ruler. In this historical background, Hasan Di Tiro established GAM (Free Aceh Movement) in 1976, and claim that Aceh never became part of Indonesia and claim political sovereignty over this territory. Acehnese think that they have heritage to the original lineage of the sultanate rulers even before 1292 A.D. On the other hand, the RI claims the Aceh is sovereign part of Indonesia as is Java or other province.

Within the country, Aceh is governed not as a province but as a special territory, which exercised more autonomy from the central government. Aceh has huge natural resources such as oil, gas, spice, minerals and timbers in their areas. However, poverty in Aceh remains significantly higher than in the rest of Indonesia, and a large number of the Acehnese remain vulnerable to basic livelihood. The richness in natural resources is not only advantages of the Acehnese people but is also the main cause of the conflict. According to Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A:

The effect of natural resource endowments is non-monotonic. Initially, increased natural resources increase the risk of war due to the taxable base of the economy constituting an attraction for rebels wishing to capture the state. However, at a high level, natural resources

³ For detail see: <http://www.etan.org/estafeta/01/winter/6aceh.htm>

start to reduce the risk of war due to the enhanced financial capacity for the government, and hence its ability to defend itself through military expenditure, gradually coming to dominate.⁴

3. Conflict analysis

After liberating Indonesia from the Netherlands in Dec. 1949, the RI started to extract huge natural resources from the Aceh province, ignoring the development needs of local people. Often the demand of economic, religious, developmental and livelihood issues of local people was not given appropriate attention by central government and never addressed properly. The extraction of natural resources like oil, gas and timber was utilized for military purposes, used in central expenditure budgets, or vanished as extreme corruption in high level military. In the duration of the first 26 years after independence, the local people did not raise the possibility of separation as sovereign state, but demanded the economic equality, proper use of natural resources for their own development and respect for Human Rights. The so called pro-nationalist leader Suharto (1967-98) and his highly centralized and authoritarian regime, in the name of national interests continuously suppressed the voice of local Acehnese people.⁵ There were continuous human rights violations, torture, unemployment, poverty, governance problems like corruptions, etc. in Aceh province in his regime. In this duration, people of Aceh have suffered a lot. The situation was fertile for hard conflict. And within the first 10 years of the Suharto's suppression (1967-1976), Acehnese people started showing resistance.

⁴ Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 1998; On economic causes of war; Oxford Economic Paper 50 (P. 571)

⁵ Many of the information related to human rights violation has been retrieved from:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4591>

In the background of the acute human rights violation of the Acehnese people in the Suharto's regime, the GAM appeared as armed insurgence group in 1976. The GAM has not only raised issues of economic inequality, unemployment, human rights violation, religious and cultural rights and other issues they also voiced identity issues of Acehnese people, political autonomy and independence from RI. In the emergence of the GAM's armed struggle, the governments after the era of Suharto regime realized the inequality issues, cultural and religious issues, violation of human rights from military and development issues of the Acehnese people. But the demands of the GAM are beyond the issues of economic grievances. In the wake of East Timor's August 1999 referendum, hundreds of thousands have marched in support of a similar act of self-determination in the Indonesian region of Aceh, a region which also has endured decades of brutal military operations. The conflict locked in this point. However, in May 2000, an agreement had been reached between GAM and RI, called the "joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause".⁶ In the name of "Humanitarian Pause" and without hurting the ego of the both the conflicting parties, the agreement could able to reduce the tension and casualty. But after 16 month of peace the violent attack again resumed. This time, the psychological impact of the Sep. 11 terrorist attack in US, played a strong role for Megawati government to resume the attack to the GAM. However in August 2005 the second peace agreement signed between the RI and GAM creates a new hope for future peace and stability, because the peace agreement addressed the identity issue of Acehnese people including other economic and social issues.

⁶ Kay, K. The "New Humanitarianism": The Henry Dunant Center and the Aceh Peace Negotiations (P. 5)

There were many actors/stakeholders⁷ in conflict in Aceh.

1. The GAM: Major insurgent organization in Aceh, fighting for identity, autonomy, independence and interest in access to natural resources
2. The Government of Indonesia: interest in territorial integrity
3. The military TNI: business interest in Aceh's natural resources, power interest, fear of investigation of past Human Rights Abuse, hostile to any peace agreements with GAM
4. Acehese provincial government and local political elite: less credibility to local people, involved in corruption, some have relation with GAM, some elites have voices
5. Civil society: Islamic organization and other social as well as Human Rights NGOs have good access and relation with different actors and people
6. The local population
7. Exxon-Mobil USA, the major oil company, which have massive investment in Aceh (Approximate extraction of oil & gas is \$40 billions USD). They are one of the major military's financiers of RI.⁸

In the post-conflict era of Aceh, in addition to above some other actors were also appeared because of the Dec. 2004 Tsunami. Those were:

1. International donor agencies and their local network NGOs

⁷ The conflict stakeholder such as: GAM, the GI, the TNI, the provincial government, civil society and local population are taken from Aspinall, E. (2005) Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation (P. 8)

⁸ For detail please refer to: Jan 4, 2005 issue of Democracy Now
http://www.democracynow.org/2005/1/4/exxonmobil_aceh_and_the_tsunami

2. International community such as: researchers, media, international high profile people, etc.

4. Tsunami and after

4.1 The Tsunami and it's destruction

On Dec. 26, 2004, a 9.0 magnitude earthquakes, whose epicenter was off the west coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra, caused a tremendously powerful tsunami in the Indian Ocean that devastated 12 Asian countries. At least 225,000 people died in the disaster, and millions were left homeless in all those countries. According to UN source 167,736 people mostly from Aceh have been killed or missing where the children and women were three times more than men. The number of people who lost livelihood was 1.5 millions. The number of people displaced was 2.1 millions and a total damage was \$10.73 billion.⁹ The effects in Indonesia were huge, with more than 150,000 casualties. Most of the deaths occurred in the war-torn province of Aceh. The tsunami traveled at high speeds and 45 minutes after the earthquake, it hit the Aceh coastline and within minutes it swept clean an 800 km coastal strip of Aceh. The Tsunami effects were seen in 300 meters strip along the side of the ocean. Within this strip, all the houses and infrastructures were destroyed. However, the non human effect beyond the first 300 meters strip was almost zero. The remaining peoples of the Tsunami lost their relatives, businesses, jobs and everything else which they have before.

4.2 Humanitarian and Development Aid

⁹ For detail please refer to: UN Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery; <http://www.undp.org/tsunami/>

The Tsunami alerted all donors to come forward for help. It was estimated that \$13.6 billion USD was needed for the post-Tsunami support for survivors of the disaster. “In Aceh, 100,000-plus homes have been built, along with 1,240 miles of road, 800 schools, and 600 hospitals and clinics.”¹⁰ In the city of 200,000 inhabitants in Aceh, billions of US dollars as an aid came in short time of last three year. But recovery has hit roadblocks - substandard housing, disputes over land rights, and uneven job creation among them. In many instances people of Aceh protested against the government for their mismanaging their aid. Most humanitarian agencies have focused on the revival of the devastated Aceh’s coastline. According to Brown, D., there was a huge dump of the materials in the post-Tsunami areas. “The duplication of works and materials”¹¹ and a lack of knowledge of the actual needs of the victims were highly problematic for donors. A survey by Oxfam found that “aid had tended to go to businesses and landowners, exacerbating the divide between rich and poor. “The poor were likely to spend much longer in refugee camps where it is harder to find work or rebuild lives.”¹² Another survey by a group of British academics monitoring the delivery of aid has found that “six months on, there is little evidence of permanent accommodation being built for most people.”¹³ Each donors and humanitarians aid agency focused on the Tsunami hit coastal areas such as feeding people, housing construction, road construction, etc. The 30 year long armed conflict, which was formerly a daily part of life for the people of Aceh, was not interlinked by aid agencies. Many conflict-affected people, who were in the rural areas or vicinity of Aceh’s coastal areas, were poorer than the

¹⁰ Anderson, M.B. 2001 The Implications of Do No Harm for Donors and Aid Agency Headquarters; <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1226/p04s01-woap.html?page=2>

¹¹ Brown, D. In Aceh, Aid Groups Seek a Niche: Relief Workers Struggle to Avoid Duplication when many needs are Unknown; Washington Post, Jan 11, 2005.

¹² Tsunami aid ‘went to the richest’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4621365.stm, June 25, 2005

¹³ Tsunami aid ‘went to the richest’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4621365.stm, June 25, 2005

Tsunami's victims and lacked access to any resource. As the aid started serving the victims of Tsunami, the conflict-affected peoples, and the ex-combatants also hoped to receive benefits. However, "ex-combatants and activists in the Indonesian province face discrimination, and most have received very little aid"¹⁴. This created new types of conflict in these areas. In addition, Aid was there but no jobs, except for a few in the public service. People received facilities such as new houses, better road networks, hospitals, schools, communications, etc. But the sustainable income remained a problem. UNDP has in some areas started to equipped local people by providing entrepreneurship training for the sustainable livelihood of the Tsunami victims, but its impact in mass level as well as armed conflict affected society was considerably less. Therefore, there is a need to develop number of programs so that its implementation would be benefited for the long term sustainable peace in Aceh.

5. Theory of Change: Meta - Conflict Approach

In the context of post-conflict and post-Tsunami Aceh, here numbers of intervention program are designed, so that concerned NGOs and/or provincial government would adapt some of these for sustainable post-conflict peace. These intervention programs are designed under the theoretical framework of "Meta – Conflict Approach"¹⁵ suggested by Fitzduff, M. A systemic conflict transformation suggested by Aspinall, E. (2005) is also similar and can equally be useful for the present post-conflict of Aceh. Such as:

¹⁴ Montlake, S., The Christian Science Monitor Jan 11, 2007 edition.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0111/p04s01-woap.html>

¹⁵ The eight intervention strategies of Meta Conflict Approach suggested by Fitzduff, M. are: Political Development with regional intervention, Democracy work, Human Right violation Equity work, Change in Military Culture, Rapid Reform in Government Institutions, Cultural and Religious Relation Building, and other like Maintenance of Law & Order, Re-foundation of Security People, Decentralization of Power, etc.

“Political/Constitutional restructuring, Designing power sharing, Security and law enforcement, Human rights, Post-tsunami rehabilitation and governance, etc”¹⁶. These program should be focused both on conflict affected Acehnese people as well as Tsunami victim. Any program if implemented separately without considering other’s suffering could not address the dynamics of conflict as a whole. The main focus of these programs are to engage unemployed people in sustainable work, change relation with land and common resources, making economically self sufficient citizen by entrepreneurship development, providing respect and values to local by working in Acehnese’s identity issue, support in developing democratic and human rights norms and implementation process, Civil Society strengthening, livelihood program, etc.

5.1 Policy Support Program in macro level

First of all, the provincial government should concentrate their full effort to develop macro level policies. The international and central government support could be requested for this purpose. These policies are: Land reform policy, Development of Human Rights Norms, Implementation Strategy of Laws and Order, Decentralization of Power Mechanism to the Village Level focusing on Transparency and Accountability, Development and Inclusion of Local Language in Schools and Provincial Government Activities, Strategy to Safeguard Local Culture, Development of Strategy Paper for Reduction of Poverty, etc. Under these broad policies government’s department have to make working policies to implement macro program. The NGOs, Civil Societies and private sectors should be guided towards achieving the macro policies goals.

¹⁶ Aspinall, E. (2005) Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation (P. 24)

5.2 Addressing Identity issue

One of the major concerns of Aceh conflict was the identity issue. The Acehnese people have been deliberately imposed by central government on the issues of language and culture. Their local language and culture have not given proper space for development in the past. Staub notes, “If groups do not have valid ways of defining themselves on the basis of their past history, tradition, values, and customs, they will have to define their identity by contract to outside groups.”¹⁷ Therefore a proper attention and support for the development of local Acehnese language is necessary to address the identity issue. In the first phase, medium of education in school level in Acehnese language should be designed and implemented. Course and curriculum should be developed, where local culture, customs, history and heritages should be included as a major part. In addition, preservation and further development (if necessary) of Acehnese people’s history, culture (including local songs, dance, music, dress-up, religious believe, etc.), customs and heritages should be included in the immediate program. A process of change should be initiated in provincial government for the inclusion of local Acehnese language in official purpose. Adequate budget should be allocated to preserve history and culture through the establishment of museums. These activities are not a quick process, however in the long run; these activities definitely support to address some of the identity issues of the Acehnese people.

5.3 Agricultural Sector Development Program for Sustainable Livelihood

¹⁷ Staub, E. The Cultural and Psychological Origins of War with Notes on Prevention (P. 8)

Mostly rural poor of Aceh were depended in agricultural activities. Those, who are near to coastal areas, were depended on the sea-fishing and tourism industries including labor work in hotel and restaurants. The land rights issues in rural areas were the main problem of rural poor. Klein writes, “Incorporating coexistence principles and practices into resource management is an essential avenue, because sharing resources peacefully is a better way forward than the alternative: destructive conflicts over control of resources.”¹⁸ The people’s rights on land is not only addressed the unemployment issues, but it also relates the social prestige and confidence, because land holding is one of the major assets of building social prestige and assets in rural areas. Therefore land reform should be a major part of post conflict sustainable peace in Aceh. After the implementation of land reform policy (as suggested earlier in macro policy reform) i.e. establishing rural landless people’s right on the agricultural land as well as village commons and forest; an integrated agricultural support program should be launched. This support program should include technical agro-training, availability of high breed seeds and fertilizer, low interest and easy loans, availability of agro-equipments if needed, irrigation support, proper use of village commons, introduction of community forest for sustainable resource extraction, fixing adequate price for agro-product and development of market, etc. Cooperatives can be introduced in rural areas for micro credit activities and training program. Experiences of BRAC¹⁹, Bangladesh would be useful in this regard. Supporting in the agricultural activities is on the one hand, help to address unemployment problem in rural areas and on

¹⁸ Klein, A. (2007) Complementary Approaches to Coexistence Work: Focus on Coexistence and Natural Resources; Coexistence International

¹⁹ BRAC, Bangladesh has developed and implemented massive programs in micro credit and agricultural training in rural areas of Bangladesh. Mostly rural women are the target group. Since rural women strengthen their economic capabilities through these programs, the rural power dynamics in their family and in communities change by empowering women at large. Please refer to: <http://www.brac.net/>

the other hand, engage people in creative activities. These types of engagement reduce the probability of erupting future violent conflict and weaken hardliners. According to Ricigliano (2005) 'lack of engagement can strengthen hardliners'²⁰. Therefore engagement of unemployed rural poor and ex-combatants in sustainable activities would positively support the present peace process.

There is a need to work side by side with the Tsunami victims also. As most of these victims are from coastal areas, they should be engaged in their previous profession i.e. fishing and tourism. For the purpose of supporting fishing activities, a local cooperative is to be formed. The cooperative would support to form small-small fishing groups, provide loan for fishing-boat (because all most all fishing-boar were destroyed by the Tsunami), fish export activities (as the local market could not consume all of the fish production), etc. Initial couple of years, the tourism can not flourish due to the impact of the Tsunami's devastation, however in long run peoples' engagement in tourism industries would be one of the main buttresses of local economy and led to erase unemployment problem.

Most of the people of Aceh province are suffered either by 30 year armed conflict or by the natural devastation of the Tsunami. The unemployment issue of one group of victims if addressed separately and left other group of victims then, there would be high possibilities of re-eruption of violent conflict in the community. Many of the Tsunami's victims have parental link and relatives to the rural areas of Aceh, where people suffered from the insurgency. Therefore, livelihood program should be designed to address both the

²⁰ Ricigliano, R. (2005) Introduction: engaging armed groups in peace process (P. 3)

victims. However, humanitarian, developmental, and law & order issues are more important for the Tsunami victims, where as identity, human rights and resource rights issues prevail more to remaining Acehnese.

5.4 Entrepreneurship Development and Private Sector Participation

Often the post-conflict societies are fragile for the couple of years. The possibilities of re-eruption of different types of violent activities are high in this period. The government herself could not serve all front immediately after the peace agreement. A strong private sector should be emerged to support the economic activities. For this, private entrepreneurship development activities should be encouraged. A clear and precise regulation and bylaws for the private sector development activities should be offered. Bureaucratic hurdles for licensing and taxation should be made easier. Trade Union rights acts should be balanced, i.e. it should support the rights of labor on one hand, and however, it should also take care of investors' interest. Rights of investors on their investment should be guaranteed through acts. A positive working environment should be created by provincial government. A positive appeal can be made for the concerned Diasporas to invest in private sector activities in Aceh. Role of Diaspora used to be crucial in any political or social conflict in the society. The Diaspora may fuel the ongoing conflict in some case or may play the role to bring down the violent conflict to the peace process. For example, in the case of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, the Tamil Diaspora is playing vital role to support LTTE for the development of a separate state. "Over the years, the LTTE established a sophisticated and integrated international support network built on Diaspora organization.....through the systematic permeation and cooperation of Tamil Diaspora

Organizations, the LTTE gained influence in many Tamil communities abroad, generating substantial revenues to purchase sophisticated weaponry and material for its violent campaign at home.”²¹ In addition, an appeal would be made to the Acehnese friend’s circle who used to support their previous insurgency, for the cause of post conflict peace and development.

5.5 Civil Society Development and Strengthening Program

The use of civil societies in the post-conflict state for sub-contracting aid, implementing community development program and supporting and strengthening grass-root NGO activities are seen successful in different post-conflict state like Rwanda, Burundi, East Timor, etc. Here in the case of Aceh, after the Tsunami a lot of international donor agency came to support post Tsunami humanitarian and reconstruction work. Their focus was more in the Tsunami victim rather than the 30 year violent conflict’s victims. The Civil Society and NGOs should address both these victims. For this, a strong coordination and cooperation would be necessary between international donors and also their local partners. Inclusion of both the victims in the process of civil societies’ activities and in all programs will reduce the disparity among victims. Michel Lund precisely describes:

Civil society groups provide an entry point for engagement in situations where governments themselves are seen to be untrustworthy partners. Thus, an underlying rationale for boosting

²¹ Ballentine, K., Nitzschke, H. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict, International Peace Academy Policy Paper, Oct 2003.

NGO capacity is premised on the desire for government accountability achieved through bottom-up, participatory and grass-root processes.²²

Hurdle-free working environment for the civil society and NGO should be developed by local provincial government. This includes: clarity and easy steps in registration, their rights assurance by laws and bylaws, working access to community level and victims, acknowledging their role as watch dog, recognizing them as development agents, etc. Prof. Fitzduff further elaborates different important roles of NGOs in ‘the areas of conflict prevention and management’²³. Fitzduff’s suggestion on the 13 roles of the NGOs in the post conflict society should be utilized for the sustainable peace process. For this local provincial and central government have to invest in civil society development, which will be a strong pillar of democracy in long run. “In sum, it is assumed that investments in strengthening civil society not only help to prevent the outbreak of violence but can deliver services while also promoting democracy.”²⁴ “NGOs are thus fast becoming a vital component of the

²² Lund, M. (2006) The Changing Policy Context for Civil Society-Building; What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (P. 3)

²³ Fitzduff describes 13 major roles of Civil Society (NGO) in the issue paper on “Civil Society and Peacebuilding – the New Fifth Estate”, these are:

- (1) act as independent Monitors and Watchdogs to prevent conflict
- (2) increase the constituencies for peace
- (3) can often do what states cannot – or will not – do
- (4) creative in reframing conflict problems
- (5) can talk to those whom governments cannot talk
- (6) useful advocates for justice and human rights
- (7) help the inclusion of women in conflict prevention and peace building
- (8) assist dialogue between politicians
- (9) can bring business leverage to bear upon a conflict
- (10) can help utilize the power of the media
- (11) can bring religious values to bear upon a conflict
- (12) help by addressing issues of safety and security
- (13) can help for the next generation work

²⁴ Uvin, P. (2006) Fostering Citizen Collective Action in Post-Conflict Societies; What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (P. 6)

international response to conflicts – going well beyond traditional roles as service providers or distributors of food.”²⁵ Emergence of strong civil society is always necessary for the sustainable democracy and good governance. The government’s intellectual and financial investment to strengthen and establish Civil Society Organizations and NGOs is key to post conflict society. Government has their own bureaucratic and financial problems to reach grass root people, where as CSOs or NGOs can have direct access to grass root people in the shortest time. They can serve grass root as well as can play a watch dog role to support the good governance.

5.6 Equity Work in all Programs

There are many structural problems of inequality between the so called military elite groups from TNI and other people, as well as between local landlords and rural people. The inequality should be fairly addressed so that every person has the equal opportunity to participate and access natural resources such as land, village commons and forests. The concept of equity and justice should be included in all public and private sector programs. For this, change in legislation policy for inclusiveness and targeted economic and cultural program (including education rights in native language) should be designed. A right based approach in health sector might be a positive initiative; the Aceh government can invest in. Fairness, justice and impartiality should be the main guiding principle for the job recruitment purpose as well as in distribution of wealth.

5.7 Good Governance, Institution Development and Decentralization

It should be noted that the existence of democracy in itself would not guarantee peace. Peace is directly related to good governance. Lack of proper service delivery to people,

²⁵ Fitzduff, M. Civil Society and Peacebuilding – the New Fifth Estate (P. 6)

corruption in high political and bureaucratic level, leakage in public property and organization, and lengthy decision making process in government are some of the problems, which led to fuel the conflict. These issues are often more serious on post conflict society. Strong institutions needed to address these issues. The rapid reform must include the principle of inclusion, participation, and respect for diversity and dignity of all people including minorities. In order to most effectively resolve conflicts and achieve lasting security, coexistence efforts need to be fully integrated into democracy and governance programs, addressing the multiple facets of a conflict in an integrated and complementary manner.²⁶ Transparency and accountability should be incorporated in all government institutions. The decentralization of power to the local level using appropriate structure is a must. “The decentralization of power can also provide a way to recognize diversity, and at the same time, engage groups in a central participatory and decision-making process” (Fitzduff 2004). In addition, a proper power sharing mechanism should be applied to include the voice of minorities like Chinese, Christian and Acehnese who speak different language other than Acehnese. The decentralization of power should not be stopped to provincial level; rather it should reach to district and village level too. Adequate representation of all ethnic and religious groups in district and provincial political and execution level should be properly incorporated.

5.8 Development of truth and reconciliation commission

People of post violent conflict have different types of suffering stories of their past, remembrance of their relatives who had been killed in the insurgency period, sorrow of

²⁶ Berns, J. and Jean, I., Focus on Coexistence and Democracy-building. July 2007. Coexistence International P. 3

different events, etc. Life will be painful with all those hurtful memory. A healing process would be necessary to overcome from past wound. Likewise, there were lot of intolerance between the military personals and central government authority, and insurgency groups (including rural people who support the insurgency) related to past suppression and human rights violations. A reunion and understanding between these groups is essential for the post conflict sustainable peace. For this, truth and reconciliation commission can play a positive role. A healing process is also needed for the Tsunami victims too who are also a part of the Acehnese community as a whole.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

External aid/program is the short term solution for any post-conflict or natural devastated society to coup up from immediate impact. For the long term and sustainable post-conflict peace process a local level self supporting program should be necessary i.e. financially and socially local level supported program. Here, three major concepts of the intervention in program level are suggested for its effective and sustainable post-conflict peace process.

- ❖ In the process of program implementation: The “Do No Harm”²⁷ concept should be included in each support program i.e. the activities of program should not fuel the underlying conflicts within society.
- ❖ In analyzing the dynamics of the different conflict in the program areas: The programs should not create disparity between the different categories of victims. For Example, in the case of Aceh, the impact of the Tsunami entirely changes the conflict dynamics of the armed insurgency. Therefore, before intervening to the program areas a quick

²⁷ Anderson, M.B. 2001

conflict analysis and conflict mapping should be done. In the case of Aceh, conflict analysis clearly indicates that separate programs for insurgency affected group only, can not address entire Aceh community, but it should be incorporated with the problem of the Tsunami victims. In addition of structural support program such as autonomy & decentralization, employment, livelihood and basic needs; a proper attention and investment should be mobilized in nurturing the identity of the Acehnese people such as language, culture, custom, ritual beliefs, etc.

- ❖ After the completion of program: The externally supported program should not create vacuum in the society after finishing its tenure. After the completion of the externally supported program (generally it used to be short duration i.e. plus/minus 5 years), there is a possibility of creating jobless and heavy economic downtrend, which may create hard conflict in future. Therefore, proper precautions should be taken prior to implementing the externally supported program. A private economy based on the previous activities and rural level industrial work should be supported to grow. For example: In the case of Aceh, private economy based on agriculture, fishing and small scale entrepreneurship should be given importance. Local level people should be involved in sustainable development activities to avoid the negative impact of the post-Tsunami-aid economic recession. The huge post-Tsunami aid if not managed and distributed equitably, then it may fuel another conflict. In addition, the post-Tsunami aid program, if completed and withdrawal after couple of year at a time, it may create economic vacuum, which generate massive unemployment problem and may lead to conflict in future.

Therefore, after the completion of post-Tsunami rebuilding and reconstruction phase, aid-program should not be stopped, but it should be gradually reduced in relation to the local internal economy growth. As the local economic activities will pick up in its natural pace (which takes long time to reach to its normal situation), the aid-program can be withdrawn. This way, the probable future economic vacuum and unemployment problems can be addressed and post-aid negative conflict can be minimized.

In addition, bringing civil society organizations on board and involving local communities in the post-conflict reconstruction and development activities including capacity building and networking are vital to the success for sustainable peace.

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